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ABSTRACT
Worm requires host computer with an address on the Internet  
and any of several vulnerabilities to create a big threat  
environment. We propose intelligent early system detection 
mechanism for detecting internet worm. The mechanism is 
combined of three techniques: Failure Connection Detection 
(FCD) which concerns with detecting the internet worm and 
stealthy worm in which computer infected by the worm by using 
Artificial Immune System; and the Traffic Signature Detection 
(TSD) which responsible for detecting traffic signature for the 
worm; and the DNA Filtering Detection (DNAFD) which 
converts traffic signature to DNA signature and sending it to all  
computer that connected with the router to create a firewall for 
new worms. Our proposed algorithm can detect difficult stealthy 
internet worm in addition to detecting unknown internet worm.
Keywords: Internet worm Detection, Firewall, Router.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The “Morris Worm” of 1988, which required no human mutual 
action but only a host computer with an address on the Internet 
and any of several vulnerabilities, created a completely new 
threat environment (Debany, 2008), that a worm could bring 
the Internet down in hours. New worm outbreaks have occurred 
periodically even though their mechanism of spreading was 
long well understood
Passive worms are different from viruses in that they are 
completely autonomous entities.  Virus is dependent upon a 
host file or boot sector, and the transfer of files between 
machines to spread, while a worm can run independently and 
spread through network connections. Active worm spread in an 
automated style and can flood the internet in a very short time. 
Anti-virus is signature-based technology (Alagna, 2005) which 
compares the file structure to the signatures stored in its 
database. If the file contain same signature, so it is infected by 
the worm. The anti-virus database must be updated 
continuously to detect new worms.
A computer worm is a self-replicating computer program. It 
uses a network to send copies of itself to other nodes (computer 
terminals on the network) and it may do so without any user 
intervention. 
Currently, worms are serious security threat that may cause 
congestion in the network which leads to large queuing delays, 
and high packet loss. Since Code Red and Nimda worms were 
spread in 2001, Epidemic-style attacks have caused huge 
damages. The Worm handling must be automatic to have any 
chance of success because worms spread too fast (Costa et al., 
2005). The internet is an influential function in the economy 
and reckon mainstay to the life. Once the internet is broken 
down, it will cause a huge economic loss.
Unlike viruses, worms do not need to attach themselves to an 
existing program. Passive worms can run completely 
independently and through a network of connections, while 
virus needs a host file, boot sector or file transfer between 
machines to propagate (worms, 2009).
There are few solutions to solve the worm attack. One of the 
solutions to update the anti-virus for detects the worms. Anti-
virus cannot detect the worm due to its spreading speed. Also, 
anti-virus cannot detect unknown internet worms automatically 
because it does not depend on the worm behavior but depends 
on signature to detect the worm. Routers and firewalls can 
block packets using traffic signatures, but this happens after the 
worm has already spread.      
Automatic detection is particularly challenging because it is 
difficult to predict what form that the next worm will take. 
However, automatic detection and response is fast becoming an 
imperative because a newly released (flash or topological) 
worm can infect millions of hosts in a matter of seconds 
(Staniford, 2004).
The technology is directed to scrutinize  the way of  the error 
message, such as RESET in TCP and ICMP (internet controller 
message protocol) destination unreachable message. 
In remainder of this paper  is organized as follows.  Section 2 
describes  related  work.   Section  3  shows  design  the  anti-
internet worm through three steps. Section 4 is the conclusion 
and future work of our system.
2.0 RELATED WORK
Schechter et al. (2004) introduced another worm detection 
method based on the failed connection. In order to reduce the 
number of false positive rates, only the first failed connection 
sent from the forged source IP address to different destination 
IP address is recorded and normal network activities are also 
considered. The activities of worms and normal users can be 
differentiated from the fact that worms usually scan different IP 
address and produce a larger number of first connection failure 
packets, and normal users also usually produce first failed 
connection packets, but will not do like this persistently. This 
algorithm can detect the internet worm but doesn’t work well 
on detecting stealthy worm. The threshold can’t reach to detect 
stealthy worm.
Yang et al. (2006) built an algorithm for detecting the worm 
which has two sub algorithms: the first algorithm “short term 
algorithm” runs well to detect worm while the second algorithm 
“longer term algorithm” cannot detect all types of the stealthy 
worm. In addition, Yang’s algorithm cannot hold any equations 
to determine specification when the equation runs in the 
algorithm to detect early worm if it has higher rate for value in 
average of failure connection. Yang’s algorithm focuses on 
detecting the computer that contains the worm only.
Jiang & Xu (2006) proposed algorithm to extract a worm’s 
behavioral footprint from the worm’s traffic traces. X. Jiang 
evolution is the number of real worms and their variants 
confirms the existence of worms’ behavioral footprints and 
demonstrates their effectiveness in worm identification. Jiang 
algorithm focused to detect known worm by filtering the traffic 
packet.
Chen & Tang (2007) analyzed the essential character of TCP-
based worm‘s propagation that is sending out a large number of 
TCP connection requests and proposed an effective approach to 
detect and contain network worms based on the number of 
failure connection received by the network routers. The 
approach can be divided into two defense phrases: short term 
and longer term. Although this strategy may works well on 
detecting uniform scanning worm and “stealthy” worm. But the 
impact of normal network activities has not been considered 
and then the rate of false alarms could be larger and take time 
to detect the worm.
Rasheed & Kadhum (2008) proposed two parts sub technique; 
the first part of the technique is concerned with detecting the 
internet worm while the second part is concerned with detecting 
stealthy internet worm. The average of failure connections is 
the main factor of that method. But this algorithm focused on 
detecting the computer that is infected by the worm. Our 
proposed algorithm detects the worm; Stealthy worm detection, 
Signature detection, and Filter detection (see Table 1).
Table 1: Mechanisms Analysis
Algorithm 
Name
Worm 
Detection
Stealthy 
Detection
Signature 
Detection
Filtering 
Detection
Schechter 
(2004)
(X) - - -
Yang 
(2006)
(X) (X) but some 
worm cannot 
detect it
Jiang 
(2006)
- - - (X)
Chen 
(2007)
(X) - - -
Rasheed 
(2008)
(X) faster 
than Yang
(X) - -
Our 
proposed 
algorithm
(X) (X) (X) (X)
3.0 DESIGN
Our system has three stages: 
• Detecting which computer contains the worm.
• Detecting the traffic signature from the computer
           that  infected by the worm.
• Filtering the packet based on firewall’s DNA.
Our design steps to create anti-worm as follow:
Figure 1: Design Steps
Our mechanism is based on research of behavioral difference 
between normal user and worm scan. The worm scans different 
IP addresses per second, normal users usually connect to 
different IP address and web sites at a slower rate. Especially, 
normal users maybe have the favorite web sites list, and do not 
produce so many attempts to connect to random addresses.
The worm generate IP address randomly; for that we received 
several  failure connection when the computer  infected by the 
worm.  An  ICMP  “Destination  Unreachable”  returned  only 
when the IP addresses is unused (Ellis et al., 2006). See figure 
2.
Figure 2: ICMP message 
When  a  SYN  packet  is  sent  to  a  used  IP  address  with 
destination port closed, TCP RESET packet is returned (Ellis et 
al., 2006). See figure3.
Figure 3:RESET message
Our system has a monitor to process for detecting worm 
signature and sending the signature to all computers that 
connected by the router (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Intelligent Anti-worm system detection
3.1 FAILURE CONNECTION DETECTION (FCD)
 
FCD appoints the difference between regular connection and 
worm connection. The worm scans different IP addresses every 
second. FCD depends on the TCP failure and ICMP 
unreachable connection on different random addresses. There 
will be in a large number of failures connections if the 
computer has worm. 
FCD is based on Artificial Immune System; the Artificial 
Immune System distinguishes between self and non-self. An 
Artificial Immune System (AIS) is a bio-inspired classification 
system which is derived from the Human Immune System 
(HIS). AIS are one of the most recent approaches in 
computational intelligence. They provide effective information 
processing capabilities. (Schaust & Drozda , 2008).
Our mechanism records the number of first failed connection 
packets such as ICMP and TCP RESET packets that returned 
from the external destination address to the internal forged and 
monitored source IP address based in the router (see figure 5). 
Once detecting the first failed connection packets, the algorithm 
then extracts (the source address, source port, destination 
address, destination port) from the packet and creates the 
record.
Figure 5: Error message returned to router
The “counter” in the FCD records the first failed connection 
packets returned from external Destination IP to the internal 
Source IP during one minute. 
We suppose β =100 Then X= (1 to n) average of failure 
connection in one minute. Threshold can be processed by the 
following equation:-
Summation of threshold= 2^ (6.65 + 0.050054 (β -X)). 
The equation depends on the average of failure connection to 
compute the threshold. FCD can detect the worm early in usual 
time. But if cannot detect in early stage, the algorithm provides 
more time and new threshold to detect the worm.
The Yang’s algorithm (Yang et al., 2006) detects the internet 
worm if the failure connection is equal or greater than 
100/minut failure connections by using "long term" algorithm. 
When the failure connection is equal or greater 3000/day failure 
connection the Yang algorithm detects this type of stealthy 
internet worm by using "shorter term" algorithm. Our algorithm 
can detect the worm by calculating different time on different 
failure connections. We use Yang’s algorithm to calculate the 
warning.
T1= (summation of Threshold / average of failure connection)
T2= (time now – time start of the algorithm)
Unlike Yang’s algorithm, FCD is more dynamic to detect the 
worm because it calculates the threshold every time.
FCD detects the worm by compare T1 to T2 as follows:
If (T2 is small or equal to T1) and (the counter is greater than 
or equal to the summation of Threshold) the worm is detected. 
Else check T1, T2. If (T2 is greater than T1), go to feed back 
and decrease the average with new calculate to give other 
chance to detect the worm. If T1 small than T2, then forward 
the traffic because which means this is normal connection , 
when the counter value does not exceed the threshold during 
time cumulative computation phrase, the traffic sent from the 
corresponding IP address would be forward as normal activity 
(see figure 6).
Figure 6: The flow chart of the FCD
3.2  TRAFFIC SIGNATURE DETECTION (TSD)
Our mechanism detects traffic unknown internet worm 
depending on source IP number that was returned by router so 
that we can collect the packet by using packets monitor because 
the worm synchronization is like DNA. So the mechanism 
depends on the packet filtering using synchronization of 
internet worm.  The Method works when the worm is detected 
by FCD after that, Signature of internet worm can be detected 
by using monitor traffic signature.
The algorithm captures all the packets with successful 
synchronization which started from source port or destination 
port number. The different infection sequences might have 
different ports. For example, in the MSBlaster worm the source 
ports vary with different infection sessions that means the 
source ports can be changed, while the destination ports are 
fixed, In this case, our mechanism uses the destination port for 
packet capturing. But other worms may have different strategy; 
the source port is fixed like Witty worm but destination port is 
changed. In this case of our method uses the source port for 
packet capturing.
The packet capturing means capture all packets between 
infector and victim when the port was opened at the victim side 
during sending request by the infector computer.
The  worm traffic  signature  (eg.  MSBlaster) is represented as 
follows by using Ethesnoop program capturing:
< TCP, X1 /infecter, 135/victim, SY N >
< TCP, 135/victim, X1/infecter, SY N, ACK >
< TCP, X1/infecter, 135/victim, ACK >
< TCP, X1/infecter, 135/victim,RST >
< TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, SY N >
< TCP, 4444/victim, X2/infecter, SY N, ACK >
< TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, ACK >
< UDP, X3/victim, 69/infecter >
< UDP, 69/infecter, X3/victim >
< TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, RST >
Source  port  for  X1,  X2,  and  X3  are  not  fix  port,  while 
destination port is 135,4444,69 there are fix port.
The worm has a successful connection, (see figure 7). 
Computer B accepts the worm from computer A because the 
worm generates random IP address in computer A and the same 
IP was used for sending to computer B. Under this condition, 
the worm is transferred from computer A to computer B when 
the port at computer B was opened.
The  method  focuses  on  this  type  of  successful  traffic 
synchronization and captures all these packets by monitor, then 
send the traffic signature to the DNAFD (see figure 8). 
Figure7: Sequence of Infected Worm (Jiang & Xu, 2006)
Figure 8 : The flow chart of the TSD 
3.3 DNA FILTERING DETECTION (DNAFD)
We  first  break  one  infection  session  into  different  infection 
phases, each of which contains a number of traffic (e.g. ICMP, 
TCP, UDP or connections).  Each flow presents a sequence of 
flow-level actions as elements in the worm’s DNA behavioral 
(Jiang & Xu, 2006). Every sequence of traffic is equal to DNA 
character and is represented as follows.
   S1   =< TCP, X1 /infecter, 135/victim, SYN >
          =< TCP, 135/victim, X1/infecter, SYN, ACK >
   A1   = < TCP, X1/infecter, 135/victim, ACK >
  R1   =< TCP, X1/infecter, 135/victim, RST >
   S2    = < TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, SYN >
           =< TCP, 4444/victim, X2/infecter, SYN, ACK >
  A2    = < TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, ACK >
           =< UDP, X3/victim, 69/infecter >
  U1    =< UDP, 69/infecter, X3/victim >
   R2   = < TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, RST >
Each DNA character letter in the DNA filtering describes either 
a  TCP flow with  different  control  bits  (SYN (S),  ACK (A), 
RST (R),  UDP flow (U),  or  an  ICMP flow (I).   The  DNA 
filtering  characters  synchronization  will  be  sent  to  all 
computers that connected with the router and after that every 
computer will filter all input and output packets (see figure 9).
Figure 9: The flow chart of the TSD 
4.0  CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
The worm is very fast spread and the techniques to detect the 
internet  worms  are  slow.  The  first  stage  of  our  proposed 
algorithm  is  detecting  the  worm  that  appoints  difference 
between regular connection and worm connection.  the second 
stage  is  generating  the  traffic  signature  for  internet  worm 
depends  on  source  IP  and  source  port  that  was  returned  by 
router and third stage represents every sequence of traffic to be 
equal to DNA character and send DNA characters signature to 
all  computers  that  are  connected  by  the  router,  then  all 
computers will filter all input and output packets using DNA. 
Our future work is to test our system.
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